PQWeave
Transitional protection — not quantum-safe

Reduce your Bitcoin quantum exposure

We'll be straight with you: Bitcoin cannot be made quantum-safe at the application layer. It has no smart-contract accounts to enforce a post-quantum signature, so a real fix needs a protocol upgrade. What you can do today is keep your public key hidden for as long as possible. This is risk reduction, not a cure.

Why this works (a little)

A Bitcoin address is a hash of your public key. The key itself stays hidden until you spend from the address — that's when the signature, and the key, become public and harvestable. So funds sitting in a fresh, never-spent address are not yet exposed. Moving there buys time; it does not make the coins quantum-proof.

Whole-wallet exposure scan

watch-only · public keys

Scan every account in a wallet at once from its extended public keys. Each chain is walked until the gap limit is reached, so coverage follows the wallet's real shape. An extended public key can read balances and history but cannot spend, and it never leaves your browser — only the addresses derived from it are looked up.

Account 1

The fingerprint and account path are optional for scanning, but supplying them lets a later sweep be signed on a hardware wallet. Your wallet shows both when it exports an extended key.

Evacuation kit

watch-only · you sign

Pre-build sweep transactions from an address you control to a fresh one, ready to broadcast within minutes if a quantum threat becomes real. We build the transactions from public data only — no key is ever requested; you sign in your own wallet or an air-gapped device. Pre-signing exposes nothing: the public key only appears when you broadcast.

This is reaction-time reduction, not quantum safety. When you broadcast, the spend still reveals the key and races the mempool. Rebuild the kit whenever you receive new coins — a pre-signed sweep only covers the UTXOs that existed when it was built.

Build your migration plan

Paste your Bitcoin addresses (up to 20), or one extended public key (xpub / ypub / zpub) to scan a whole watch-only wallet. We check which addresses have already revealed their public key, then give you a personalized checklist. Nothing is stored on our side and no keys — not even the extended public key — are ever kept.

The steps, in detail

  1. 1

    Create a brand-new, never-used address

    In your own wallet, generate a fresh native SegWit address (starts with bc1q). Do not reuse an old one. Avoid Taproot (bc1p) here — Taproot key-path spends reveal the public key in the output, which defeats the purpose.

  2. 2

    Move your funds to it in one transaction

    Consolidate your balance into the new address. PQWeave never touches your keys — you sign this in your own wallet. Until you spend from the new address, only its hash is public, so the key stays hidden.

  3. 3

    Treat every address as one-time

    Each spend re-reveals the public key behind that address. Receive into fresh addresses and avoid address reuse, so a revealed key never guards remaining funds.

What this does not do

  • This is transitional, not quantum-safe. The moment you spend from the new address, its public key is revealed again.
  • A sufficiently fast quantum attacker could still race your spend — seeing the key in the mempool and trying to forge a conflicting transaction before yours confirms.
  • There is no post-quantum signature protecting Bitcoin today. This only defers exposure; it does not remove it.
  • The permanent fix is a Bitcoin protocol upgrade — e.g. BIP-360 (Pay-to-Quantum-Resistant-Hash) — which is consensus-level and not something any app can ship.

The same transitional approach applies to other first-spend chains (Litecoin, Dogecoin, and similar). Only EVM chains support a true quantum-safe migration today, because only they have the account layer to enforce a post-quantum signature.

Scan another addressQuantum-safe migration (EVM)